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Abstract. We develop a formal model of Algorand stateless smart con-
tracts (stateless ASC1.) We exploit our model to prove fundamental
properties of the Algorand blockchain, and to establish the security of
some archetypal smart contracts. While doing this, we highlight various
design patterns supported by Algorand. We perform experiments to vali-
date the coherence of our formal model w.r.t. the actual implementation.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are agreements between two or more parties that are auto-
matically enforced without trusted intermediaries. Blockchain technologies rein-
vented the idea of smart contracts, providing trustless environments where they
are incarnated as computer programs. However, writing secure smart contracts
is difficult, as witnessed by the multitude of attacks on smart contracts platforms
(notably, Ethereum) — and since smart contracts control assets, their bugs may
directly lead to financial losses.
Algorand [21] is a late-generation blockchain that features a set of interesting
features, including high-scalability and a no-forking consensus protocol based
on Proof-of-Stake [9]. Its smart contract layer (ASC1) aims to mitigate smart
contract risks, and adopts a non-Turing-complete programming model, natively
supporting atomic sets of transactions and user-defined assets. These features
make it an intriguing smart contract platform to study.
The official specification and documentation of ASC1 consists of English
prose and a set of templates to assist programmers in designing their contracts
[1,5]. This conforms to standard industry practices, but there are two drawbacks:
1. Algorand lacks a mathematical model of contracts and transactions suitable
for formal reasoning on their behaviour, and for the verification of their
properties. Such a model is needed to develop techniques and tools to ensure
that contracts are correct and secure;
2. furthermore, even preliminary informal reasoning on non-trivial smart con-
tracts can be challenging, as it may require, in some corner cases, to resort
to experiments, or direct inspection of the platform source code.
Given these drawbacks, we aim at developing a formal model that:
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a, b, . . . Users (key pairs)
x,y, . . . ∈ X Addresses
τ , τ ′ , . . . ∈ A Assets
v, v′, w, . . . ∈ Z Values
σ, σ′ ∈ A ⇀ N Balances
x[σ] Accounts
t, t′ , . . . ∈ T Transactions
e, e ′ , . . . Scripts
r, r′ . . . ∈ N Rounds
TK ⊆ T Transactions in last 1000 rounds
fmngr ∈ A → X Asset manager
flx ∈ (X× N)⇀ N Lease map
ffrz ∈ X ⇀ 2
A Freeze map
Γ, Γ ′ , . . . Blockchain states
|= σ Valid balance
flx, r |= t Valid time constraint
W |= T , i Authorized transaction in group
JeKW
T ,i Script evaluation
Table 1: Summary of notation.
o1. is high-level enough to simplify the design of Algorand smart contracts and
enable formal reasoning about their security properties;
o2. expresses Algorand contracts in a simple declarative language, similar to
PyTeal (the official Python binding for Algorand smart contracts) [7];
o3. provides a basis for the automatic verification of Algorand smart contracts.
Contributions. This paper presents:
– a formal model of stateless ASC1 providing a solid theoretical foundation
to Algorand smart contracts (§2). Such a model formalises both Algorand
accounts and transactions (§2.1 – §2.4, §2.6), and smart contracts (§2.5);
– a validation of our model through experiments [6] on the Algorand platform;
– the formalisation and proof of some fundamental properties of the Algorand
state machine: no double spending, determinism, value preservation (§2.7);
– an analysis of Algorand contract design patterns (§3.2), based on several
non-trivial contracts (covering both standard use cases, and novel ones).
Quite surprisingly, we show that stateless contracts are expressive enough to
encode arbitrary finite state machines;
– the proof of relevant security properties of smart contracts in our model;
– a prototype tool that compiles smart contracts (written in our formal declar-
ative language) into executable TEAL code (§4).
Our model is faithful to the actual ASC1 implementation. Still, for the sake
of clarity, we introduce minor high-level abstractions over low-level details. For
instance, since TEAL code has the purpose of accepting or rejecting transactions,
we model it using expressions that evaluate to true or false. We discuss the
differences between our model and the actual Algorand platform in (§5).
2 The Algorand state machine
This section introduces our formal model of the Algorand blockchain, including
its smart contracts (stateless ASC1.) We present the model incrementally: we
first define the basic transactions that generate and transfer assets (§2.1–§2.3),
and then add atomic groups of transactions (§2.4), smart contracts (§2.5), and
authorizations (§2.6). We discuss the main differences between our model and
Algorand in §5.
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2.1 Accounts and transactions
We use a, b, . . . to denote public/private key pairs (kpa , k
s
a). Users interact with
Algorand through pseudonymous identities, obtained as a function of their public
keys. Hereafter, we freely use a to refer to the public or the private key of a, or to
the user associated with them, relying on the context to resolve the ambiguity.
The purpose of Algorand is to allow users to exchange assets τ , τ ′ , . . . Besides
the Algorand native cryptocurrency Algo, users can create custom assets.
We adopt the following notational convention:
– lowercase letters for single entities (e.g., a user a);
– uppercase letters for sets of entities (e.g., a set of users A);
– calligraphic uppercase letters for sequences of entities (e.g., list of users A).
Given a sequence L, we write |L| for its length, set(L) for the set of its elements,
and L.i for its ith element (i ∈ 1..|L|); ε denotes the empty sequence. We write:
– {x 7→v} for the function mapping x to v, and having domain equal to {x};
– f{x 7→v} for the function mapping x to v, and y to f(y) if y 6= x;
– f{x 7→⊥} for the function undefined at x, and mapping y to f(y) if y 6= x.
Accounts. An account is a deposit of one or more crypto-assets. We model
accounts as terms x[σ], where x is an address uniquely identifying the account,
and σ is a balance, i.e., a finite map from assets to non-negative integers. In
the concrete Algorand, an address is a 58-characters word; for mathematical
elegance, in our model we represent an address as either:
– a single user a. Performing transactions on a[σ] requires a’s authorization;
– a pair (A, n), where A is a sequence of users, and 1 ≤ n ≤ |A|, are multisig
(multi-signature) addresses. Performing transactions on (A, n)[σ] requires
that at least n users out of those in A grant their authorization;5
– a script6 e. Performing transactions on e[σ] requires e to evaluate to true.
Each balance is required to own Algos, have at least 100000 micro-Algos for
each owned asset, and cannot control more than 1000 assets. Formally, we say
that σ is a valid balance (in symbols, |= σ) when:7
Algo ∈ dom (σ) ∧ σ(Algo) ≥ 100000 · | dom (σ)| ∧ | dom (σ)| ≤ 1001
Transactions. Accounts can append various kinds of transactions to the
blockchain, in order to, e.g., alter their balance or set their usage policies. We
model transactions as records with the structure in Fig. 1. Each transaction
has a type, which determines which of the other fields are relevant.8 The field
5 W.l.o.g., we consider a single-user address a equivalent to (A, n) with A= 〈a〉, n=1.
6 We formalize scripts (i.e., smart contracts) later on, in §2.5.
7 Since the codomain of σ is N, the balance entry σ(Algo) represents micro-Algos.
8 In Algorand, the actual behaviour of a transaction may depend on both its type and
other conditions, e.g., which optional fields are set. For instance, pay transactions
may also close accounts if the CloseRemainderTo field is set. For the sake of clarity,
in our model we prefer to use a richer set of types; see §5 for other differences.
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open rcv, val snd creates account rcv, transferring val Algo
pay rcv, val, asst snd transfers val units of asst to rcv
close rcv, asst snd gives asst to rcv and removes it (if Algo, closes snd)
gen rcv, val snd mints val units of a new asset, managed by rcv
optin asst snd opts in to receive units of asset asst
burn asst asst is removed from snd (if it is the creator and sole owner)
rvk rcv, val, asst asst’s manager transfers val units of asst from snd to rcv
frz asst asst’s manager freezes snd’s use of asset asst
unfrz asst asst’s manager unfreezes snd’s use of asset asst
delegate asst, rcv asst’s manager delegates asst to new manager rcv
Fig. 1: Transaction types (fields type, snd, fv, lv, lx are common to all types.)
snd usually refers to the subject of the transaction (e.g., the sender in an assets
transfer), while rcv refers to the receiver in an assets transfer. The fields asst and
val refer, respectively, to the affected asset, and to its amount. The fields fv (“first
valid”), lv (“last valid”) and lx (“lease”) are used to impose time constraints.
Algorand groups transactions into rounds r = 1, 2, . . . To establish when a
transaction t is valid, we must consider both the current round r, and a lease
map flx binding pairs (address, lease identifier) to rounds: this is used to enforce
mutual exclusion between two or more transactions (see e.g. the periodic payment
contract in §3). Formally, we define the temporal validity of a transaction
t by the predicate flx, r |= t, which holds whenever:
t.fv ≤ r ≤ t.lv and t.lv − t.fv ≤ 1000 and(
t.lx = 0 or (t.snd, t.lx) 6∈ dom (flx) or r > flx(t.snd, t.lx)
)
First, the current round must lie between t.fv and t.lv, whose distance cannot
exceed 1000 rounds. Second, t must have a null lease identifier, or the identifier
has not been seen before (i.e., flx(t.snd, t.lx) is undefined), or the lease has expired
(i.e., r > flx(t.snd, t.lx)). When performed, a transaction with non-null lease
identifier acquires the lease on (t.snd, t.lx), which is set to t.lv.
2.2 Blockchain states
We model the evolution of the Algorand blockchain as a labelled transition
system. A blockchain state Γ has the form:
x1[σ1] | · · · | xn[σn] | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz (1)
where all addresses xi are distinct, | is commutative and associative, and:
– r is the current round;
– TK is the set of transactions in the last 1000 rounds, used to avoid duplicates;
– fmngr is a map from assets to addresses of their assets managers;
– flx is the lease map (from pairs (address, integer) to integers), used to
ensure mutual exclusion between transactions;
– ffrz is a map from addresses to sets of assets, used to freeze assets.
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We define the initial state Γ0 as a0[{Algo 7→v0}] | 0 | ∅ | fmngr | flx | ffrz, where
dom (fmngr) = dom(flx) = dom (ffrz) = ∅, a0 is the initial user address, and
v0 = 10
16 (which is the total supply of 10 billions Algos.)
We now formalize the ASC1 state machine, by defining how it evolves by sin-
gle transactions (§2.3), and then including atomic groups of transactions (§2.4),
smart contracts (§2.5), and the authorization of transactions (§2.6).
2.3 Executing single transactions
We write Γ
t
−→1 Γ ′ to mean: if the transaction t is performed in blockchain state
Γ, then the blockchain evolves to state Γ ′ .9 We specify the transition relation −→1
through a set of inference rules (see Fig. 4 in the Appendix for the full definition):
each rule describes the effect of a transaction t in the state Γ of eq. (1). We now
illustrate all cases, depending on the transaction type (t.type).
When τ ∈ dom (σ), we use the shorthand σ + v:τ to update balance σ by
adding v units to token τ ; similarly, we write σ − v:τ to decrease τ by v units:
σ + v:τ ≡ σ{τ 7→σ(τ ) + v} σ − v:τ ≡ σ{τ 7→σ(τ )− v}
Open. Let t.snd = xi for some i ∈ 1..n, let t.rcv = y 6∈ {x1, . . . ,xn} (i.e., the
sender account x is already in the state, while the receiver y is not), and let
t.val = v. The rule has the following preconditions:
c1. t has not been observed in the last 1000 rounds (t 6∈ TK);
c2. the time interval of the transaction, and its lease, are respected (flx, r |= t);
c3. the updated balance of xi is valid (|= σi − v : Algo);
c4. the balance of the new account at address y is valid (|= {Algo 7→v}).
If these conditions are satisfied, the new state Γ ′ is the following:
xi[σi − v:Algo] | y[{Algo 7→v}] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
In the new state, the Algo balance of xi is decreased by v units, and a
new account at y is created, containing exactly the v units taken from xi. The
balances of the other accounts are unchanged. The updated lease mapping is:
upd(flx, t, r) =
{
flx{(t.snd, t.lx) 7→t.lv} if t.lx 6= 0
flx otherwise
Note that all transaction types check conditions c1 and c2 above; further, all
transactions check that updated account balances are valid (as in c3 and c4.)
Pay. Let t.snd = xi, t.rcv = xj , t.val = v, and t.asst = τ . Besides the common
checks, performing t requires that xj has “opted in” τ (formally, τ ∈ dom (σj)),
and τ must not be frozen in accounts xi and xj (formally, τ 6∈ ffrz(xi)∪ffrz(xj)).
If xi 6= xj , then in the new state the balance of τ in xi is decreased by v units,
and that of τ in xj is symmetrically increased by v units:
9 Note that Γ
t
−→1 Γ
′ does not imply that transaction t can be performed in Γ: in fact,
t might require an authorization. We specify the required conditions in §2.6.
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xi[σi − v:τ ] | xj[σj + v:τ ] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
where all accounts but xi and xj are unchanged. Otherwise, if xi = xj , then the
balance of xi is unchanged, and the other parts of the state are as above.
Close. Let t.snd = xi, t.rcv = xj 6= xi, and t.asst = τ . Performing t has two
possible outcomes, depending on whether τ is Algo or a user-defined asset. If
τ = Algo, we must check that σi contains only Algos. If so, the new state is:
xj [σj + σi(Algo):Algo] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
where the new state no longer contains the account xi, and all the Algos in xi
are transferred to xj . Instead, if τ 6= Algo, performing t requires to check only
that xi actually contains τ , and that xj has “opted in” τ . Further, τ must not
be frozen for addresses xi and xj , i.e. τ 6∈ ffrz(xi) ∪ ffrz(xj). The new state is:
xi[σi{τ 7→⊥}] | xj [σj + σi(τ ):τ ] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
where τ is removed from xi, and all the units of τ in xi are transferred to xj .
Gen. Let t.snd = xi, t.rcv = xj , and t.val = v. Performing t requires that xi
has enough Algos to own another asset, i.e. |= σi{τ 7→v}, where τ is the (fresh)
identifier of the new asset. In the new state, the balance of xi is extended with
{τ 7→v}, and fmngr is updated, making xj the manager of τ . The new state is:
xi[σi{τ 7→v}] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr{τ 7→xj} | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
Opt in. Let t.snd = xi and t.asst = τ . Performing t requires that τ already
occurs in Γ, and that xi has enough Algos to store it. If the balance σi does not
have an entry for τ , in the new state σi is extended with a new entry for τ :
xi[σi{τ 7→0}] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
Otherwise, if xi’s balance has already an entry for τ , then σi is unchanged.
Burn. Let t.snd = xi and t.asst = τ . Performing t requires that xi is the
creator of τ , and that xi stores all the units of τ (i.e., there are no units of τ in
other accounts). In the resulting state, the token τ no longer exists:
xi[σi{τ 7→⊥}] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr{τ 7→⊥} | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
Note that this transaction requires an authorization by the asset manager of τ ,
which is recorded in fmngr (we address this topic in §2.6.)
Revoke. Let t.snd = xi and t.rcv = xj . Performing t requires that both xi
and xj are already storing the asset τ , and that τ is not frozen for xi and xj .
In the new state, the balance of xi is decreased by v = t.val units of the asset
τ = t.asst, and the balance of xj is increased by the same amount:
xi[σi − v:τ ] | xj[σj + v:τ ] | · · · | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
Freeze and unfreeze. A frz transaction t with t.snd = xi and t.asst = τ
updates the mapping ffrz into f
′
frz, such that f
′
frz(xi) = ffrz(xi)∪{τ }, whenever
the asset τ is owned by xi. This effectively prevents any transfers of the asset
τ to/from the account xi. The dual transaction unfrz updates the mapping ffrz
into f ′frz such that f
′
frz(xi) = ffrz(xi) \ {τ }.
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e ::= v constant
| e ◦ e arithmetic (◦ ∈ {+,−, <,≤,=,≥,>, ∗, /,%, and, or })
| not e negation
| txlen number of transactions in the atomic group
| txpos index of current transaction in the atomic group
| txid(n) identifier of n-th transaction in the atomic group
| tx(n).f value of field f of n-th transaction in the atomic group
| arglen number of arguments of the current transaction
| arg(n) n-th argument of the current transaction
| H(e) hash
| versig(e, e, e) signature verification
Syntactic sugar: false ::=1= 0 true ::=1= 1 tx.f ::= tx(txpos).f txid ::= txid(txpos)
if e0 then e1 else e2 ::= (e0 and e1) or ((not e0) and e2)
Fig. 2: Smart contract scripts (inspired by PyTeal [7]).
Delegate. A delegate transaction t with t.snd = xi, t.rcv = xj and t.asst = τ
updates the manager of τ , provided that fmngr(τ ) = xi. In the updated mapping
fmngr{τ 7→xj}, the manager of τ is xj .
Initiating a new round. We model the advancement to the next round of
the blockchain as a state transition Γ
X
−→1 Γ ′ . In the new state Γ ′ , the round is
increased, and the set TK of the transactions in the last 1000 rounds is updated
as T ′K = {t ∈ TK | t.lv > r}. The other components of the state are unchanged.
2.4 Executing atomic groups of transactions
Atomic transfers allow state transitions to atomically perform sequences of
transactions. To atomically perform a sequence T = t1 · · · tn from a state Γ, we
must check that all the transactions ti can be performed in sequence, i.e. the
following precondition must hold (for some Γ1, . . . , Γn):
Γ
t1−→1 Γ1 · · · Γn−1
tn−→1 Γn
If so, the state Γ can take a single-step transition labelled T . Denoting the new
transition relation with −→, we write the atomic execution of T in Γ as follows:
Γ
T
−→ Γn
2.5 Executing smart contracts
In Algorand, custom authorization policies can be defined with a smart contract
language called TEAL [8]. TEAL is a bytecode-based stack language, with an
official programming interface for Python (called PyTeal): in our formal model,
we take inspiration from the latter to abstract TEAL bytecode scripts as terms,
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JvKW
T ,i = v Je ◦ e
′KW
T ,i = JeK
W
T ,i ◦⊥ Je
′KW
T ,i Jnot eK
W
T ,i = ¬JeK
W
T ,i
Jtx(n).fKW
T ,i = (T .n).f (0 ≤ n < |T |) Jtxid(n)K
W
T ,i = T .n (0 ≤ n < |T |)
JtxlenKW
T ,i = |T | JtxposK
W
T ,i = i Jarg(n)K
W
T ,i = W.n (0 ≤ n < |W|) JarglenK
W
T ,i = |W|
JH(e)KW
T ,i = H(JeK
W
T ,i) Jversig(e1, e2, e3)K
W
T ,i = verk(m,s)
(
m =
(
T .i.snd, Je1K
W
T ,i
)
s = Je2K
W
T ,i k = Je3K
W
T ,i
)
Fig. 3: Evaluation of scripts in Fig. 2.
with the syntax in Fig. 2. Besides standard arithmetic-logical operators, TEAL
includes operators to count and index all transactions in the current atomic
group, and to access their id and fields. When firing transaction involving scripts,
users can specify a sequence of arguments; accordingly, the script language
includes operators to know the number of arguments, and access them. Further,
scripts include cryptographic operators to compute hashes and verify signatures.
The script evaluation function JeKW
T ,i (Fig. 3) evaluates e using 3 pa-
rameters: a sequence of arguments W, a sequence of transactions T forming an
atomic group, and the index i< |T | of the transaction containing e. The script
tx(n).f evaluates to the field f of the nth transaction in group T . The size of T is
given by txlen, while txpos returns the index i of the transaction containing the
script being evaluated. The script arg(n) returns the nth argument in W, whose
length is given by arglen. The script H(e) applies a public hash function H to the
evaluation of e. The script versig(e1, e2, e3) verifies a signature e2 on the message
obtained by concatenating the enclosing script and e1, using public key e3. All
operators in Fig. 3 are strict : they fail if the evaluation of any operand fails.
2.6 Authorizing transactions, and user-blockchain interaction
As noted in footnote 9, the mere existence of a step Γ
t
−→1 Γ ′ does not imply that
t can actually be issued. For this to be possible, users must provide a sequenceW
of witnesses, satisfying the authorization predicate associated with t; such
a predicate is uniquely determined by the authorizer address of t, written
auth(t, fmngr). For transaction types open , close, pay , gen, optin the authorizer
address is t.snd; for burn, rvk , frz and unfrz on an asset τ it is the asset manager
fmngr(τ ). Intuitively, if auth(t, fmngr) = x, then W authorizes t iff:
1. if x is a multisig address (A, n), then W contains at least n signatures of t,
made by the users in A; (if x is a single-user address a: see footnote 5)
2. if x is a script e, then e evaluates to true under the arguments W.
We now formalize the intuition above. Since the evaluation of scripts depends
on a whole group of transactions T , and on the index i of the current transac-
tion within T , we define the authorization predicate as W |= T , i (read: “W
authorizes the ith transaction in T”.) Let sigA(m) stand for the set of signatures
containing siga(m) for all a ∈ A; then, W |= T , i holds whenever:
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1. if auth(T .i, fmngr) = (A, n), then |set(W) ∩ sigset(A)(T , i)| ≥ n
2. if auth(T .i, fmngr) = e, then JeK
W
T ,i = true
Given a sequence of sequences of witnesses W = W0 · · ·Wn−1 with n = |T |, the
group authorization predicate W |= T holds iff Wi |= T , i for all i∈0..n−1.
User-blockchain interaction. We model the interaction of users with the
blockchain as a transition system. Its states are pairs (Γ,K), where Γ is a
blockchain state, while K is the set of authorization bitstrings currently known
by users. The transition relation
ℓ
=⇒ (with ℓ∈{w,X,W:T}) is given by the rules:
(Γ,K)
w
=⇒ (Γ,K ∪ {w})
Γ
X
−→ Γ ′
(Γ,K)
X
=⇒ (Γ ′ ,K)
Γ
T
−→ Γ ′ set(W) ⊆ K W |= T
(Γ,K)
W:T
===⇒ (Γ ′ ,K)
With the first two rules, users can broadcast a witness w, or advance to the
next round. The last rule gathers from K a sequence of witnesses W, and lets
the blockchain perform an atomic group of transactions T if authorized by W.
2.7 Fundamental properties of ASC1
We now exploit our formal model to establish some fundamental properties of
ASC1. Theorem 1 states that the same transaction t cannot be issued more
than once, i.e., there is no double-spending. In the statement, we use −→∗
T
−→−→∗
to denote an arbitrarily long series of steps including a group of transactions T .
Theorem 1 (No double-spending). Let Γ0 −→∗
T
−→−→∗ Γ
T
′
−→ Γ ′ . Then, no
transaction occurs more than once in TT′ .
Define the value of an asset τ in a state Γ = x1[σ1] | · · · | xn[σn] | r | · · · as
the sum of the balances of τ in all accounts in Γ:
val τ (Γ) =
∑n
i=1 val τ (σi) where val τ (σ) =
{
σ(τ ) if τ ∈ dom(σ)
0 otherwise
Theorem 2 states that, once an asset is minted, its value remains constant,
until the asset is eventually burnt. In particular, since Algos cannot be burnt
(nor minted, unlike in Bitcoin and Ethereum), their amount remains constant.
Theorem 2 (Value preservation). Let Γ0 −→
∗ Γ −→∗ Γ ′ . Then:
val τ (Γ
′) =
{
valτ (Γ) if τ occurs in Γ and it is not burnt in Γ −→
∗ Γ ′
0 otherwise
Theorem 3 establishes that the transition systems−→ and =⇒ are deterministic:
crucially, this allows reconstructing the blockchain state from the transition log.
Notably, by item 3 of Theorem 3, witnesses only determine whether a state
transition happens or not, but they do not affect the new state. This is unlike
Ethereum, where arguments of function calls in transactions may affect the state.
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Theorem 3 (Determinism). For all λ∈{X,T} and ℓ∈{X, w}:
1. if Γ
λ
−→ Γ ′ and Γ
λ
−→ Γ ′′ , then Γ ′ = Γ ′′ ;
2. if (Γ,K)
ℓ
=⇒ (Γ ′ ,K ′) and (Γ,K)
ℓ
=⇒ (Γ ′′ ,K ′′), then (Γ ′ ,K ′) = (Γ ′′ ,K ′′);
3. if (Γ,K)
W:T
==⇒ (Γ ′ ,K ′) and (Γ,K)
W
′:T
==⇒ (Γ ′′ ,K ′′), then Γ ′=Γ ′′ and K ′=K ′′=K.
3 Designing secure smart contracts in Algorand
We now exploit our formal model to design some archetypal smart contracts,
and establish their security (§3.2). First, we introduce an attacker model.
3.1 Attacker model
We assume that cryptographic primitives are secure, i.e., hashes are collision
resistant and signatures cannot be forged (except with negligible probability). A
run R is a (possibly infinite) sequence of labels ℓ1ℓ2 · · · such that (Γ0,K0)
ℓ1=⇒
(Γ1,K1)
ℓ2=⇒ · · · , where Γ0 is the initial state, and K0 = ∅ is the initial (empty)
knowledge; hence, as illustrated in §2.6, each label ℓi in a run R can be either
w (broadcast of a witness bitstring w), W:T (atomic group of transactions T
authorized by W), or X (advance to next round.) We consider a setting where:
– each user a has a strategy Σ, i.e. a PPTIME algorithm to select which
label to perform among those permitted by the ASC1 transition system. A
strategy takes as input a finite run R (the past history) and outputs a single
enabled label ℓ. Strategies are stateful : users can read and write a private
unbounded tape to maintain their own state throughout the run. The initial
state of a’s tape contains a’s private key, and the public keys of all users;10
– an adversary Adv who controls the scheduling with her stateful adversar-
ial strategy ΣAdv : a PPTIME algorithm taking as input the current run R
and the labels output by the strategies of users (i.e., the steps that users are
trying to make). The output of ΣAdv is a single label ℓ, that is appended to
the current run. We assume the adversarial strategy ΣAdv can delay users’
transactions by at most δAdv rounds, where δAdv is a given natural number.
11
A set Σ of strategies of users and Adv induces a distribution of runs; we say that
run R is conformant to Σ if R is sampled from such a distribution. We assume
that infinite runs contain infinitely many X: this non-Zeno condition ensures
that neither users nor Adv can perform infinitely many transactions in a round.
10 Notice that new public/private key pairs can be generated during the run, and their
public parts can be communicated as labels w.
11 Without this assumption, Adv could arbitrarily disrupt deadlines: e.g., ΣAdv could
make a always lose lottery games (like the ones below) by delaying a’s transactions.
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3.2 Smart contracts
We now exploit our model to specify some archetypal ASC1 contracts, and reason
about their security. To simplify the presentation, we assume δAdv =0, i.e., the
adversary Adv can start a new round (performing X) only if all users agree.12
The table below summarises our selection of smart contracts, highlighting the
design patterns they implement.
Use case / Pattern
Signed
Timeouts
Commit/ State Atomic Time
witness reveal machine transfer windows
Oracle X X
HTLC X X
Mutual HTLC (§B.1) X X X
O(n2)-collateral lottery X X X
0-collateral lottery (§B.2) X X X X
Periodic payment X
Escrow (§B.3) X X
Two-phase authorization X X X
Limit order (§B.4) X X
Split (§B.5) X X
Oracle. We start by designing a contract which allows either a or b to withdraw
all the Algos in the contract, depending on the outcome of a certain boolean
event. Let o be an oracle who certifies such an outcome, by signing the value 1
or 0. We model the contract as the following script:
Oracle , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and
(
(tx.fv > rmax and tx.rcv = a)
or (arg(0) = 0 and versig(arg(0), arg(1), o) and tx.rcv = a)
or (arg(0) = 1 and versig(arg(0), arg(1), o) and tx.rcv = b)
)
Once created, the contract accepts only close transactions, using two argu-
ments as witnesses. The argument arg(0) contains the outcome, while arg(1) is
o’s signature on (Oracle , arg(0)), i.e., the concatenation between the script and
the first argument. The user b can collect the funds in Oracle if o certifies the
outcome 1, while a can collect the funds if the outcome is 0, or after round rmax .
Theorem 4 below proves that Oracle works as intended. To state it, we define
T p as the set of transactions allowing a user p to withdraw the contract funds:
T p = {t | t.type = close, t.snd = Oracle , t.rcv = p, t.asst = Algo}
The theorem considers the following strategies for a, b, and o:
– Σa : wait for s = sigo(Oracle , 0); if s arrives at round r ≤ rmax , then imme-
diately send a transaction t ∈ T a with t.fv = r and witness 0 s; otherwise,
at round rmax + 1, send a transaction t ∈ T a with t.fv = rmax + 1;
– Σb : wait for s
′ = sigo(Oracle , 1); if s
′ arrives at round r, immediately send
a transaction t ∈ T b with t.fv = r and witness 1 s′;
– Σo : do one of the following: (a) send o’s signature on (Oracle , 0) at any time,
or (b) send o’s signature on (Oracle , 1) at any time, or (c) do nothing.
12 All results can be easily adjusted for δAdv > 0, but this would require more verbose
statements to account for possible delays introduced by Adv.
12 Bartoletti et al.
Theorem 4. Let R be a run conforming to some set of strategies Σ, such that:
(i) Σo ∈ Σ; (ii) R reaches, at some round before rmax , a state Oracle [σ] | · · · ; (iii) R
reaches the round rmax + 2. Then, with overwhelming probability:
(1) if Σa ∈ Σ and o has not sent a signature on (Oracle , 1), then R contains a
transaction in T a ;
(2) if Σb ∈ Σ and o has sent a signature on (Oracle , 1) at round r ≤ rmax , then
R contains a transaction in T b .
Notice that in item (1) we are only assuming that a and o use the strate-
gies Σa and Σo , while b and Adv can use any strategy (and possibly collude.)
Similarly, in item (2) we are only assuming b’s and o’s strategies.
Hash Time Lock Contract (HTLC). A user a promises that she will either
reveal a secret sa by round rmax , or pay a penalty to b. More sophisticated con-
tracts, e.g. gambling games, use this mechanism to let players generate random
numbers in a fair way. We define the HTLC as the following contract, parame-
terised on the two users a, b and the hash ha = H(sa) of the secret:
HTLC (a, b, ha) , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and(
(tx.rcv = a and H(arg(0)) = ha) or (tx.rcv = b and tx.fv ≥ rmax )
)
The contract accepts only close transactions with receiver a or b. User a can
collect the funds in the contract only by providing the secret sa in arg(0), effec-
tively making sa public.
13 Instead, if a does not reveal sa , then b can collect the
funds after round rmax . We state the correctness of HTLC in Theorem 5; first,
let T p be the set of transactions allowing user p to withdraw the contract funds:
T p =
{
t
∣∣ t.type = close, t.snd = HTLC (a, b, ha), t.rcv = p, t.asst = Algo}
We consider the following strategies for a and b:
– Σa : at a round r < rmax , send a t ∈ T a with t.fv = r and witness sa ;
– Σb : at round rmax , check whether any transaction in T a occurs in R. If not,
then immediately send a transaction t ∈ T b with t.fv = rmax .
Theorem 5. Let R be a run conforming to some set of strategies Σ, such that:
(i) R reaches, at some round before rmax , a state HTLC (a, b, ha)[σ] | · · · ; (ii) R
reaches the round rmax + 1. Then, with overwhelming probability:
(1) if Σa ∈ Σ, then R contains a transaction in T a ;
(2) if Σb ∈ Σ and R does not contain the secret sa before round rmax + 1, then
R contains a transaction in T b .
Lotteries. Consider a gambling game where n players bet 1Algo each, and the
winner, chosen uniformly at random among them, can redeem nAlgos. A simple
implementation, inspired by [11–13] for Bitcoin, requires each player to deposit
13 If sa is a sufficiently long bitstring generated uniformly at random, collision resistance
of the hash function ensures that only a (who knows sa) can provide such an arg(0).
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n(n− 1)Algos as collateral in an HTLC contract.14 For n = 2 players a and b,
such deposits are transferred by the following transactions:
tHa = {type : open , snd : a, rcv : HTLC (a, b, ha), val : 2, . . .}
tHb = {type : open , snd : b, rcv : HTLC (b, a, hb), val : 2, . . .}
The bets are stored in the following contract, which determines the winner as a
function of the secrets, and allows her to withdraw the whole pot:
Lottery , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo andH(arg(0)) = ha andH(arg(1)) = hb
and if (arg(0) + arg(1))%2 = 0 then tx.rcv = a else tx.rcv = b
with ha 6=hb .
15 Players a and b start the game with the atomic transactions:
Ta,b = tHa tHb tLa tLb where:
tLa = {type : open , snd : a, rcv : Lottery , val : 1, . . .}
tLb = {type : pay , snd : a, rcv : Lottery , val : 1, asst : Algo, . . .}
The transaction tLa creates the contract with a’s bet, and tHb completes it with
b’s bet. At this point, there are two possible outcomes:
(a) both players reveal their secret. Then, the winner can withdraw the pot, by
performing a close action on the Lottery contract, providing as arguments
the two secrets, and setting her identity in the rcv field;
(b) one of the players does not reveal the secret. Then, the other player can
withdraw the collateral in the other player’s HTLC (and redeem her own).
To formalise the correctness of the lottery, consider the sets of transactions:
T secrp,q =
{
t
∣∣ t.type = close, t.snd = HTLC (p, q, hp), t.rcv = p, t.asst = Algo}
T toutp,q =
{
t
∣∣ t.type = close, t.snd = HTLC (p, q, hp), t.rcv = q, t.asst = Algo}
T lottp = {t | t.type = close, t.snd = Lottery , t.rcv = p, t.asst = Algo}
and consider the following strategy Σa for a (the one for b is analogous):
1. at some r < rmax , send a transaction t ∈ T
secr
a,b with t.fv = r and witness sa ;
2. if some transaction in T secrb,a occurs in R at round r
′ < rmax , then extract its
witness sb and compute the winner; if a is the winner, immediately send a
transaction t∈T lotta with t.fv = r
′ and witness sasb ;
3. if at round rmax no transaction in T b,a occurs in R, immediately send a
transaction t∈T toutb,a with t.fv = rmax .
Theorem 6 below establishes that the lottery is fair, implying that the ex-
pected payoff of player a following strategy Σa is at least negligible; instead, if
a does not follow Σa (e.g., by not revealing her secret), the expected payoff may
be negative; analogous results hold for player b. This result can be generalised
for n>2 players, with a collateral of n(n− 1)Algos. As in the HTLC, we assume
that sa and sb are sufficiently long bitstrings generated uniformly at random.
Theorem 6. Let R be a run conforming to a set of strategies Σ, such that:
(i) R contains, before rmax , the label Ta,b ; (ii) R reaches round rmax +1. For
p 6= q ∈ {a, b}, if Σp ∈ Σ, then: (1)R contains a transaction in T
secr
p,q ; (2)the
probability that R contains T toutq,p or T
lott
p is ≥
1
2 (up-to a negligible quantity).
14 A zero-collateral lottery is presented in §B.
15 This check prevents a replay attack: if a chooses ha=hb , then b cannot win.
14 Bartoletti et al.
Periodic payment. We want to ensure that a can withdraw a fixed amount
of v Algos at fixed time windows of p rounds. We can implement this behaviour
through the following contract, which can be refilled when needed:
PP (p, d, n) , tx.type = pay and tx.val = v and tx.asst = Algo and
tx.rcv = a and tx.fv% p = 0 and tx.lv = tx.fv + d and tx.lx = n
The contract accepts only pay transactions of v Algos to receiver a. The condi-
tions tx.fv% p = 0 and tx.lv = tx.fv+ d ensure that the contract only accepts
transactions with validity interval [k p, k p+d], for k∈N. The condition tx.lx = n
ensures that at most one such transactions is accepted for each time window.
Finite-state machines. Consider a set of users A who want to stipulate a
contract whose behaviour is given by a finite-state machine with states q0, . . . , qn.
We can implement such a contract by representing each state qi as a script ei;
the current state/script holds the assets, and each state transition qi → qj is
a clause in ei which enables a close transaction to transfer the assets to ej .
This clause requires tx.rcv = ej — except in case of loops, which cannot be
encoded directly:16 in this case, we identify the next state as tx.rcv = arg(0),
also requiring all users in A to sign arg(0) to confirm its correctness. To ensure
that any user in A can trigger a state transition (by firing the corresponding
transaction), their signatures must be exchanged before the contract starts. An
instance of this pattern is illustrated below.
Two-phase authorization. We want a contract to allow user c to withdraw
some funds, but only if authorized by a and b. We want a to give her authoriza-
tion first; if b’s authorization is not given within p ≥ 1000 rounds, then anyone
can fire a transaction to reset the contract to its initial state. We model this con-
tract with two scripts: P1 represents the state where no authorization has been
given yet, while P2 represents the state where a’s authorization has been given.
Conceptually, the contract implements a finite-state machine, looping between
two states until the contract funds are withdrawn by c.
P1 , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and versig(txid, arg(0), a) and
tx.rcv = P2 and tx.fv%(4 ∗ p) = 0 and tx.lv = tx.fv + 1000
P2 , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and(
(versig(txid, arg(0), b) and tx.rcv = c) or
(versig(arg(0), arg(1), a1) and versig(arg(0), arg(2), b1) and
tx.rcv = arg(0) and tx.fv%(4 ∗ p) = 2 ∗ p and tx.lv = tx.fv + 1000)
)
The scripts P1 and P2 use a time window with 4 frames, each lasting p rounds.
Script P1 only accepts close transactions which transfer the balance to P2 ; the
time constraint ensures that such transactions are sent in the first time frame.
The script P2 accepts two kinds of transactions: (a) transfer the balance to c,
using an authorization by b; (b) transfer the balance to P1 , in the 4th time frame.
Note that in P2 we cannot use the (intuitively correct) condition tx.rcv = P1 , as
16 This is because Algorand contracts cannot have circular references: contract accounts
are referenced by script hashes, and no script can depend on its own hash.
A formal model of Algorand smart contracts 15
it would introduce a circularity. Instead, we apply the state machines technique
described above: we require tx.rcv = arg(0), with arg(0) signed by both a and
b,17 and assume that these signatures are exchanged before the contract starts.
4 From the formal model to concrete Algorand
Our modelling approach is supported by a prototype tool, called secteal (secure
TEAL), and accessible via a web interface (in anonymized form) at:
https://secteal.azurewebsites.net
The core of the tool is a compiler that translates smart contracts written as
expressions, based on the script language (§2.5), into executable TEAL bytecode.
In its current form, secteal supports experimentation with our model, and is
provided with a series of examples from §3.2. Users can also compile their own
secteal contracts, paving the way to a declarative approach to contract design
and development. secteal is a first building block toward a comprehensive IDE
for the design, verification, and deployment of contracts on Algorand.
5 Conclusions
This work is part of a wider research line on formal modelling of blockchain-
based contracts, ranging from Bitcoin [14, 27, 32] to Ethereum [19, 23–26, 30],
Cardano [20], Tezos [18], and Zilliqa [33]. These formal models are a necessary
prerequisite to rigorously reason on the security of smart contracts, and they are
the basis for automatic verification. Besides modelling the behaviour of trans-
actions, in §3.1 we have proposed a model of attackers: this enables us to prove
properties of smart contracts in the presence of adversaries, in the spirit of long-
standing research in the cryptography area [10, 11, 15, 17, 22, 28, 29].
Differences between our model and Algorand Besides not modelling the
consensus protocol, to keep the formalization simple, we chose to abstract from
some aspects of ASC1, which do not appear to be relevant to the development of
(the majority of) smart contracts. First, we are not modelling some transaction
fields: among them, we have omitted the fee field, used to specify an amount of
Algos to be paid to nodes, and the note field, used to embed arbitrary bitstrings
into transactions. We associate a single manager to assets, while Algorand uses
different managers for different operations (e.g., the freeze manager for frz/unfrz
and the clawback manager for rvk .) We use two different transactions types, pay
and close, to perform asset transfers and account closures: in Algorand, a single
pay transaction can perform both. Note that we can achieve the same effect by
performing the pay and close transactions within the same atomic group. Our
script language substantially covers all TEAL opcodes, but for a few exceptions,
e.g. bitwise operations, different hash functions, jumps.
17 We use other key pairs a1 and b1 to avoid confusion with the signatures on txid.
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Future work In mid August 2020, Algorand has introduced stateful ASC1
contracts [4], enriching contract accounts with a persistent key-value store, ac-
cessible and modifiable through a new kind of transaction (which can use an ex-
tended set of TEAL opcodes.) To accommodate stateful contracts in our model,
we would need to embed the key-value store in contract accounts, and extend the
script language with key-value store updates. The rest of our model (in particu-
lar, the semantics of transactions and the attacker model) is mostly unaffected
by this extension. Future work could also investigate declarative languages for
stateful Algorand smart contracts, and associated verification techniques. An-
other research direction is the mechanization of our formal model, using a proof
assistant: this would allow machine-checking the proofs developed by pencil-and-
paper in §C. Similar work has been done e.g. for Bitcoin [32] and for Tezos [18].
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A The ASC1 state machine
We assume the following sets:
– K, the set of all users;
– S, the set of all scripts;
– X = (K∗ × N) ∪ S, the set of all addresses;
– A, the set of all assets;
– T, the set of all transactions.
We define the partial operator ◦ on accounts as follows:
σ ◦ v : τ = σ{τ 7→σ(τ ) ◦ v} if τ ∈ dom (σ) and ◦ ∈ {+,−}
We define a function auth(t, fmngr) which gives the manager of a transaction t:
auth(t, fmngr) =
{
t.snd if t.type ∈ {open, close , pay , gen, optin}
fmngr(t.asst) if t.type ∈ {rvk , frz , unfrz , burn, delegate}
We define the following operators on denotations, evaluating to denotations:
ν0 ◦⊥ ν1 ≡
{
ν0 ◦ ν1 if ν0, ν1 ∈ Z
⊥ otherwise
(◦ ∈ {+,−,=, <, . . .})
A blockchain state Γ is a term with the following syntax:
Γ ::= x[σ] | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz | Γ | Γ
′
and subject to the following conditions:
– all the terms except x[σ] occur exactly once in a configuration;
– r ∈ N is the current round ;
– TK ⊆ T is the set of the transactions in the last 1000 rounds;
– fmngr ∈ A→ X is the manager map;
– flx ∈ (X× N)→ N is the lease map;
– ffrz ∈ X→ 2A is the freeze map;
– if x[σ] and y[σ′] occur in a configuration, then x 6= y.
– configurations form a commutative monoid with respect to the composition
operator | (with identity 0.)
We define in Fig. 4 a labelled transition relation−→ between blockchain states,
where labels are the following:
– T performs a sequence of transactions;
– X advances one round.
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B Additional smart contracts
B.1 Mutual HTLC
The mutual HTLC [11] is a variant of HTLC presented in §3.2: two users a, b
choose their own secrets, pay a deposit, and the contract ensures that either
(a) both users reveal their secret and get their deposits back, or (b) whoever
does not reveal the secret loses the deposit (in favour of the other user.)
Assuming that ha and hb are, respectively, the hashes of the secrets sa and
sb , we can implement the mutual HTLC by creating two HTLC contracts within
an atomic group of transactions:
{snd : a, rcv : HTLC (a, b, ha), . . .} {snd : b, rcv : HTLC (b, a, hb), . . .}
The mutual HTLC contract guarantees that once a has stipulated it, then
she will either learn b’s secret, or receive the compensation. Instead, if we create
two instances of HTLC in a non-atomic way, this property is not guaranteed,
since b could refuse to stipulate its part of the contract.
Theorem 7 states the correctness of the mutual HTLC. For p, q ∈ {a, b}, let:
T p,q =
{
t
∣∣ t.type = close, t.snd = HTLC (p, q, hp), t.rcv = p, t.asst = Algo}
T ′p, q =
{
t
∣∣ t.type = close, t.snd = HTLC (p, q, hp), t.rcv = q, t.asst = Algo}
and consider the following strategy for distinct users p 6= q ∈ {a, b}:
– Σp : at a round r < rmax , send a transaction t ∈ T p,q with t.fv = r and
witness sp . Then, at round rmax check whether any transaction in T q,p occurs
in R: if not, immediately send a transaction t∈T ′q,p with t.fv = rmax .
Theorem 7. Let R be a run conforming to some set of strategies Σ, such that:
(i) R reaches, before rmax , a state HTLC (a, b, ha)[σ] | HTLC (b, a, hb)[σ
′] | · · · ; (ii) R
reaches rmax + 1. Let p 6= q ∈ {a, b}. If Σp ∈ Σ, then with overwhelming proba-
bility: (1) R contains a transaction in T p,q ; (2) if R does not contain the secret
sq before round rmax + 1, then R contains a transaction in T
′
q,p .
B.2 Zero-collateral lottery
We show a variant of the two-players lottery in §3.2 which requires no collateral,
similarly to [16,31]. The preconditions just require the 1Algo bets and the secrets,
while the contract is the following:
ZDL , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and(
(tx.rcv = ZDL2 and H(arg(0)) = ha) or
(tx.rcv = b and tx.fv ≥ r0)
)
ZDL2 , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and H(arg(0)) = ha and(
(H(arg(1)) = hb and
if (arg(0) + arg(1))%2 = 0 then tx.rcv = a else tx.rcv = b) or
(tx.rcv = a and tx.fv ≥ r0 + r1)
)
Here, b must reveal first. If b does not reveal his secret by the deadline r0,
then a can redeem the 2Algos stored in the contract. Otherwise, a in turn must
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reveal by the deadline r0+r1, or let b redeem 2Algos. If both a and b reveal, then
the winner is determined as a function of their secrets. As before, the rational
strategy for each player is to reveal the secret. This makes the lottery fair, even
in the absence of a collateral.
B.3 Escrow
User a wants to buy from seller b an item that costs v Algos. We want to guaran-
tee that (1) b will get paid if a authorizes the payment; (2) a will be refunded if
b authorizes it; (3) if neither a nor b give their authorization, an escrow service
c will resolve the dispute, by either fully refunding a, or partially refunding a
with va Algos and giving the remaining (v − va)Algos to b.
Escrow , tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and
(
versig(txid, arg(1), a) and (tx.rcv = b or tx.rcv = Resolve )
or versig(txid, arg(1), b) and (tx.rcv = a or tx.rcv = Resolve )
)
Resolve , tx.type = pay and tx.asst = Algo and versig(arg(0), arg(1), c) and(
(tx.rcv = a and tx.val = arg(0)) or
(tx.rcv = b and tx.val = v − arg(0))
)
B.4 Limit order
The limit order contract [2] allows a user a to exchange her Algos for units
of a certain asset τ , provided by any user. The contract imposes a lower bound
ρmin to the exchange rate τ /Algo, and guarantees its operation as long as it has
enough funds, and a deadline rmax is not reached (after then, a can close it). To
this purpose, the contract accepts two kinds of actions:
– an atomic group of two pay transactions: the first one transfers v0 Algos from
the contract to the sender of the second one; the second transaction transfers
v1 units of τ to user a. The contract ensures that: (i) the ratio between v1
and v0 is greater then a given constant ρmin ; (ii) v0 is greater than a given
constant vmin . Note that such a group can be issued by any user owning
enough units of the asset τ , without requiring any interaction from a.
– a single transaction where a closes the contract after the deadline rmax .
The following script implements this specification:(
txlen = 2 and txpos = 0 and
tx(0).type = pay and tx(0).asst = Algo and tx(0).rcv = tx(1).snd and
tx(1).type = pay and tx(1).asst = τ and tx(1).rcv = a and
tx(1).val/tx(0).val ≥ ρmin and tx(0).val ≥ vmin
)
or(
txlen = 1 and tx.fv > rmax and
tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and tx(0).rcv = a
)
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B.5 Split
The split contract [3] is created by a user a, who want to transfer its funds to
users b0 and b1 in a fixed ratio ρ. The contract is initially funded with some
Algos from a, and once started it accepts two kinds of actions:
– an atomic group of two pay transactions whose sender is the split contract:
the first transaction transfers v0 Algos to b0, while the second one transfers
v1 Algos to b1. The contract ensures that: (i) the ratio between v1 and v0 is
equal to a given constant ρ; (ii) v0 is greater than a given constant vmin .
– a single transaction where a closes the contract after a deadline rmax .
The following script implements this specification:(
txlen = 2 and tx(0).snd = tx(1).snd and
tx(0).type = pay and tx(0).asst = Algo and tx(0).rcv = b0 and
tx(1).type = pay and tx(1).asst = Algo and tx(1).rcv = b1 and
tx(1).val = ρ ∗ tx(0).val and tx(0).val ≥ vmin
)
or(
txlen = 1 and tx.fv > rmax and
tx.type = close and tx.asst = Algo and tx(0).rcv = a
)
C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
By induction on the length of the run.
Conditions c1 and c2 are required at each step.
Condition c1 prevents the same transaction T to appear again for the next
1000 rounds (t /∈ TK). Condition c1 requires transaction T to be valid only
in a time window of at most 1000 rounds (t.lv − t.fv ≤ 1000). Therefore, it is
impossible for t to appear more than once.
Proof of Theorem 2
By induction on the length of the run, and by cases on the rules generating each
step.
Inspecting the rules, we can see that they all preserve the value for all assets,
except for [Burn] which completely destroys the asset, and [Gen] which can create
a fresh asset. The rules prevent a burnt asset to be re-created later on.
The two special cases are taken into account in the definition of valτ (Γ), so
the theorem holds.
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Proof of Theorem 3
By induction on the length of the run, and by cases on the rules generating each
step.
Inspecting each pair of (different) rules, we can observe that they either have
distinct labels or they have conflicting side conditions, so that at most one of
them can apply in each case. Further, we observe that in each rule the final state
is a function of the label and of the initial state.
For part 3 of the theorem involving different labels W:T and W′:T , we
further add that (Γ,K)
W:T
===⇒ (Γ ′ ,K) is possible only when Γ
T
−→ Γ ′ holds, and
the same holds for W′:T . We conclude that the difference between W and W′
is immaterial, since the determinism of =⇒ is derived from the determinism of −→
which does not involve witnesses.
Proof of Theorem 4
For item (1), assume that Σa , Σo ∈ Σ. By hypothesis, o has not sent a signa-
ture s = sigo(Oracle , 1). By contradiction, assume that R does not contain a
transaction in T a . We have the following two cases:
1. o has sent a signature on (Oracle , 0) at round r ≤ rmax . Then, since R
conforms to Σa , at round r, user a has sent a transaction t ∈ T a with t.fv = r
and witness 0 s. By construction, t satisfies the script Oracle . Hence, to prove
the thesis we show that Oracle was not closed earlier in R. By inspecting
the script Oracle , there are only three conditions under which a previous
transaction t′ can close the contract:
(a) t′ .fv > rmax : impossible, because t.fv = r ≤ rmax ;
(b) t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 1): impossible, since it would
contradict the hypothesis;
(c) t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 0): this implies that t′ ∈ T a
— contradiction.
2. o has not sent a signature on (Oracle , 0) at any round r ≤ rmax . Then,
since R conforms to Σa , at round rmax + 1, user a has sent a transaction
t ∈ T a with t.fv = rmax + 1. By construction, t satisfies the script Oracle .
Hence, to prove the thesis we show that Oracle was not closed earlier in R.
By inspecting the script Oracle , there are only three conditions under which
a previous transaction t′ can close the contract:
(a) t′ .fv ≥ rmax : impossible, because we would have t′ ∈ T a , contradicting
the hypothesis;
(b) t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 1): impossible, since it would
contradict the hypothesis;
(c) t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 0): this implies that t′ ∈ T a
— contradiction.
For item (2), assume that Σb , Σo ∈ Σ. By hypothesis, o has sent a signature
s′ on (Oracle , 1) at round r ≤ rmax . By contradiction, assume that R does not
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contain a transaction in T b . Then, since R conforms to Σb , at round r, user b
has sent a transaction t ∈ T b with t.fv = r and witness 1 s′. By construction, t
satisfies the script Oracle . Hence, to prove the thesis we show that Oracle was
not closed earlier in R. By inspecting the script Oracle , there are only three
conditions under which a previous transaction t′ can close the contract:
1. t′ .fv > rmax : impossible, because t.fv = r ≤ rmax ;
2. t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 1): this implies that t′ ∈ T b —
contradiction.
3. t′ is validated by o’s signature on (Oracle , 0): impossible, since it would
contradict the honesty of o, which requires that the oracle never signs both
0 and 1;
Proof of Theorem 5
For item (1), assume that Σa ∈ Σ. By contradiction, assume that R does not
contain a transaction in T a . Since R conforms to Σa , at round r, user a has sent
a transaction t ∈ T a with t.fv = r and witness sa . By construction, t satisfies
the script HTLC . Hence, to prove the thesis we show that HTLC was not closed
earlier in R. By inspecting the script HTLC , there are only two conditions under
which a previous transaction t′ can close the contract:
1. t′ .fv > rmax : impossible, because t.fv = r ≤ rmax ;
2. t′ is validated using a preimage of ha : this implies that t
′ ∈ T a — contradic-
tion.
For item (2), assume that Σb ∈ Σ, and that sa was not revealed before round
rmax +1. By contradiction, assume that R does not contain a transaction in T b .
Since R conforms to Σb , at round rmax , user b has sent a transaction t ∈ T b
with t.fv = rmax . By construction, t satisfies the script HTLC . Hence, to prove
the thesis we show that HTLC was not closed earlier in R. By inspecting the
script HTLC , there are only two conditions under which a previous transaction
t′ can close the contract:
1. t′ .fv > rmax : this implies that t
′ ∈ T b — contradiction.
2. t′ is validated using a preimage of ha : this implies, with overwhelming prob-
ability, that sa was used as the preimage. In such case, it was revealed and
occurs in R at round rmax — contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 6
The proof for the fairness of the lottery protocol when implemented on Bitcoin
appeared in [11, 12]. This protocol relies on running, simultaneously, two timed
commitments (for which we use HTLC ) and a contract that transfers the bets
to the winner, which can be computed after the secrets have been revealed (for
which we use Lottery ).
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We already proved the security of HTLC in Theorem 5, which implies part
1 of the thesis: a honest participant p will reveal her secret in time with a
transaction in T secrp,q .
For part 2, the argument is similar to the one for the original protocol. Briefly
put, if the other participant q does not to reveal sq in time, p wins the lottery
by timeout using a transaction in T toutq,p . If instead sq is revealed in time, since
sp was chosen in a uniformly random way, independently from sq (which has a
different hash), we have that the parity of sp + sq is a random bit, uniformly
distributed. Hence, if p won, her strategy makes her send a transaction in T lottp
and claim the pot.
In the argument above we neglected the case where q reveals another preimage
than sq as his secret, since that can only happen with negligible probability.
Summing up, an honest p wins with at least 1/2 probability (up-to a negligible
quantity).
Proof of Theorem 7
The proof is analogous to the one for HTLC in Theorem 5.
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t.type = open t.snd = x t.rcv = y y[· · ·] not in Γ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
|= σ − t.val : Algo σ′ = {Algo 7→ t.val} |= σ′
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ − t.val : Algo] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Open]
t.type = close t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.asst = Algo flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
dom (σ) = {Algo} y[· · ·] not in x[σ] | Γ σ′ = {Algo 7→σ(Algo)} |= σ′
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Close-Open]
t.type = close t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.asst = Algo flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
dom (σ) = {Algo}
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
y[σ′ + σ(Algo) : Algo] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Close-Pay]
t.type = close t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ 6= Algo σ(τ ) = v τ ∈ dom (σ′) |= σ′ + v : τ τ 6∈ ffrz(x) ∪ ffrz(y)
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ{τ 7→⊥}] | y[σ′ + v : τ ] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Close-Asst]
t.type = pay t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.val = v > 0 t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
|= σ − v : τ τ ∈ dom (σ′) τ 6∈ ffrz(x) ∪ ffrz(y)
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ − v : τ ] | y[σ′ + v : τ ] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Pay]
t.type = pay t.snd = x t.rcv = y 6= x t.val = 0 flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Pay-Zero]
t.type = gen t.snd = x t.rcv = y val = v flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
|= σ{τ 7→v} τ next fresh asset identifier
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ{τ 7→v}] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr{τ 7→y} | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Gen]
t.type = optin t.snd = x t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ occurs in x[σ] | Γ σ′ =
{
σ{τ 7→0} if τ 6∈ dom (σ)
σ otherwise
|= σ′
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ′] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Optin]
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t.type = burn t.snd = x t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ ∈ dom (σ) for all y[σ′] in Γ : τ 6∈ dom (σ′) x creator of τ
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ{τ 7→⊥}] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr{τ 7→⊥} | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Burn]
t.type = rvk t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.val = v t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ ∈ dom(σ) ∩ dom(σ′) |= σ − v : τ
x[σ] | y[σ′] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ − v : τ ] | y[σ′ + v : τ ] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Revoke]
t.type = frz t.snd = x t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ ∈ dom (σ) f ′frz = ffrz{x 7→ffrz(x) ∪ {τ }}
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | f
′
frz
[Freeze]
t.type = unfrz t.snd = x t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
τ ∈ dom(σ) f ′frz = ffrz{x 7→ffrz(x) \ {τ }}
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
x[σ] | Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr | upd(flx, t, r) | f
′
frz
[Unfreeze]
t.type = delegate t.snd = x t.rcv = y t.asst = τ flx, r |= t t 6∈ TK
x = fmngr(τ )
Γ | r | TK | fmngr | flx | ffrz
t
−→1
Γ | r | TK ∪ {t} | fmngr{τ 7→y} | upd(flx, t, r) | ffrz
[Delegate]
Γ | TK | r
X
−→1 Γ | {t ∈ TK | t.lv > r} | r + 1
[Round]
T = t1 · · · tn Γ
t1−→1 Γ1 · · · Γn−1
tn−→1 Γn
Γ
T
−→ Γn
[TxG]
(Γ,K)
w
=⇒ (Γ,K ∪ {w})
[Net-Wit]
Γ
X
−→ Γ ′
(Γ,K)
X
=⇒ (Γ ′ ,K)
[Net-Round]
Γ
T
−→ Γ ′ set(W) ⊆ K W |= T
(Γ,K)
W:T
===⇒ (Γ ′ ,K)
[Net-TxG]
Fig. 4: The ASC1 state machine.
